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'They went to sea in a Sieve, they did, 
In a Sieve they went to sea: 
In spite of all their friends could say, 
On a winter's morn, on a stormy day, 
In a Sieve they went to sea! 
And when the Sieve turned round and round, 
And everyone cried, "You'll all be drowned!" 
They called aloud, "Our Sieve ain't big, 
But we don't care a button! we don't care a fig! 
In a Sieve we'll go to sea!" 
And everyone said, who saw them go, 
"O won't they be soon upset, you know! 
For the sky is dark, and the voyage is long, 
And happen what may, it's extremely wrong 
In a Sieve to sail so fast!" 
The water it soon came in, it did, 
The water it soon came in; 
So to keep them dry, they wrapped their feet 
In a Pinky paper all folded neat, 
And they fastened it down with a pin. 
And they passed the night in a crockery-jar, 
And each of them said, "How wise we are! 
Though the sky be dark, and the voyage long, 
Yet we never can think we were rash or wrong, 
While round in our Sieve we spin!"' (l) 
(Abridged from Edward Lear's 'The Jumblies') 
In his recent article on 'The Politics of Unemployment in 
Scotland' Stephen Maxwell suggests that Scottish unemployment has 
lost much of its salience as a political issue. (
2
) Despite the un-
precedented rise in the numbers of jobless - by January 1981 1 in 
8 of the Scottish working population was registered as unemployed -
there has been no sustained campaign against unemployment compar-
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able with that of the early 1970's. It seems that Scotland has 
accepted the unacceptable: the reemergence of mass unemployment.
Unlike its predecessor in 1972, the STUC Conference on Scottish 
unemployment in November 1980 failed to provide a focal point for
Scottish opposition to Westminster. The passive response to the 
closure of Talbot's Linwood car plant in February 1981 contrasts 
sadly with the dramatic work-in at Upper Clyde Shipbuilders laun-
ched in August 1971 - which put Scotland in the forefront of a 
broadly based and effective campaign against the policies of Mr 
Heath's Conservative Government. Apart from the impressive 
through the streets of Glasgow in February 1981, Labour's 
tion to the present Government has been channelled mainly 
ineffectually - through orthodox parliamentary and 
channels. Meanwhile unemployment has continued to rise and for 
many the prospect of finding or keeping a job has become grim. 
Yet little heed has been given to the problems of the unemployed.
Speculation about the so-called "black economy" and persistent 
propaganda about social security abuse and voluntary unemploy-
ment(3) have shifted the blame for unemployment to the victims 
themselves. Politicians in both main parties have been as reluc-
tant to accept responsibility for high unemployment as they were 
eager to claim credit when unemployment was low(
4 J. 
In this paper we shall challenge the view that nothing much 
can be done about unemployment. Scottish unemployment has risen 
sharply during the present recession (section 1) and we shall 
argue that in large measure this is a result of the Government's 
monetarist approach (section 2). But however savage the impact o
the current monetarist aberration, unemployment in Scotland 
been rising (in fits and starts) since the mid-1960's and 
long-term problems in Scottish industry and society. We shall 
therefore consider the main trends in the Scottish labour market 
over this period (section 3) and the changing impact of 
ment on different sections of Scottish society (section 4). 
Finally we shall consider (section 5) some of the alternative 
approaches which could be adcpted in an effort to reduce the ex-
tent and impact of unemployment in Scotland. 
90 
l~Unemployment and the recession. 
As the National Institute for Economic and Social Research 
argue(
5 J, the present recession which began in the second half of 
1979 is comparable in many ways with the depression of the early 
1930's. Between 1929 and 1931 the slump involved a fall in Bri-
tain's real Gross Domestic Product of some 5% while manufactur-
ing output fell almost 11%. By comparison, 1980 alone witnessed a 
fall in real Gross Domestic Product of ~' and manufacturing out-
put of 9%. The decline in industrial production in Scotland has not 
been quite as bad as that in the U.K.( 6 J. In Scotland the index 
(excluding the oil sector) fell from an annual average of 99.6 in 
1979 to 91.8 in the third quarter (3Q) of 1980 compared with a 
U.K. fall from 104.3 to 94.6 in the same period (1975 = 100). 
Nevertheless the estimates of Scottish job losses during the curr-
ent recession show its unprecedented severity post-war. Total em-
ployment in Scotland fell by 77,000 in the year to September 1980, 
with 61,000 (81%) of these jobs in manufacturing. Falls were great-
est in textiles (-14%), engineering (-13%) and metal manufacture 
(-11.4%). While manufacturing bore the brunt of the recession, for 
once all sectors of employment were affected, with falls in pri-
mary industries (-1.2%), construction (-3.6%) and even services 
(-0.3%). 
The severity of job losses is evident in the statistics of 
notified redundancies, which in Scotland during 1980 were running 
at more than three times the figure for 1978( 7 ). Of the 60,826 re-
dundancies notified in 1980, almost 3 out of 4 occurred in manu-
facturing industry, particularly in the three industries noted 
above for their net job loss. While Scotland's share of U.K. re-
dundancies was about the usual 13% in 1980 after being higher in 
1979, redundancies were unevenly distributed within Scotland. In 
1980 Strathclyde Region had slightly under half of all employment 
in Scotland but 60% of all notified redundancies and 65.6% of 
notified manufacturing redundancies. Job losses have not been con-
fined to ailing industries. For example, the closure of ICI's 
nylon works at Ardeer involves a modern factory built within the 
last few years(
8 J. The 700 jobs lost result from ICI's attempt to 
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total loss o£ some 12,000 jobs over 1980/1981. It is a sad comment 
on prevailing values that these job losses attracted little atten-
tion while the decline in ICI's prorits (pre-tax losses o£ £6 
million in the rinal quarter o£ 1980) and in particular its cut 
dividend (the rirst since 1938) caused much anxiety and were wide-
ly taken to show that even the most e££icient sections o£ British 
industry were not immune £rom the damaging repercussions o£ the 
recession. 
The recession took the number o£ people registered as unem-
ployed in Scotland above 200,000 in January 1980 and over 285,000 
in January 1981. By May 1981 the total had reached 288,200(
9
). I£ 
forecasts o£ U.K. unemployment o£ ~ million are realised then 
Scottish unemployment is likely to rise above 400,000(lO)• In 
uary 1933, at the depth o£ the slump, the o££icial rigure £or un-
employment in Scotland stood at 407,300(ll). Some 120,000 people 
had been unemployed £or over 6 months in January 1981 and almost 
60,000 had been out o£ work £or over a year(l
2
). Yet only 
ago - in June 1966 - total registered unemployment stood at less 
than 60,000( 13 )! -----
Even so, the rise in registered unemployment does not 
exactly changes in total employment. Total employment £ell 
and registered unemployment rose 46,000 in the year to September 
1980(l4 ). In other words, the working population o£ Scotland is in
decline through reduced economic activity and outmigration. Women 
who lose jobs but do not register as unemployed, juveniles on 
Opportunities Schemes, early retirees who do not register (e.g. 
those on Job Release Schemes) and perhaps even migrants can all 
described as 'the hidden unemployed'. The £all in employment has 
also been moderated by a decline in working hours through reduced 
overtime and increased short-time working. Short-time work in 
particular was encouraged by the Temporary Short-time Working 
pensation Scheme which was runding 41,400 workers on short-time 
January 198l(l5 ). Altogether the decline in hours worked between 
October 1979 and December 1980 was_equivalent 
ployees working a standard 40 hour week(l
6
). 
The uneven geographical impact o£ the recession is 
the rates o£ unemployment in 
in Table 1 (the regions are listed in terms o£ their 1979 rates 
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starting with the lowest): 
TABLE 1 
Unemployment rates £or the Scottish Regions, 
June 1979 - January 1981 
Region June 1979 January 1981 Change in rate 
Shetlands 2.8 4.6 +1.8 
Borders 3.5 7.5 +4.0 
Grampian 4.6 7.3 +2.7 
Orkneys 5.7 9.5 +3.8 
Lothian 6.5 9.7 +3.2 
Central 7.2 11.8 +4.6 
Fire 7.9 11.6 +3.7 
Tayside 8.0 12.7 +4.7 
Dunrries & Galloway 8.0 12.4 +4.4 
Highland 8.4 l1.5 +3.1 
Strathclyde 9.8 15.1 +5.3 
Western Isles 11.8 18.8 +7.0 
Source: Department o£ Employment Gazette, July 1979 and February, 
- 1981 
By and large the geographical inequalities have grown, with the large-
st increases in rates in those regions already worst a££ected(l7 ). 
Central and Southern Scotland have borne the brunt o£ the recession. 
In Strathclyde almost 1 in 2 unemployed men had been out o£ work £or 
over 6 months in January 1981 (compared with nearer 1 in 5 in Grampian, 
Highland and the Borders)(l8 ). The unemployment rates £or selected 
employment o££ice areas (mostly towns and cities and their travel to 
work areas) in Table 2 show the increasingly high concentrations o£ 
unemployment in some parts o£ Scotland (again these are listed in 




-:• TABLE 2 
Unemployment rates £or selected 
Employment O££ice Areas in Scotland, 













































Source: Department of Employment Gazette, July 1979 and February 
1981 
The greatest increases in unemployment during the recession have 
occurred in towns with high unemployment already; the lowest in 
towns and cities with least unemployment. The contrast 
one considers only male unemployment. In depressed towns like 
and Bathgate unemployment has risen much more rapidly amongst 
women, while in the Scottish cities the rise in 
has been well above average. Thus, in Edinburgh 
unemployment (53%) was faster than in male unemployment (50%); 
in Bathgate the rise in male unemployment (84%) was much more rapid 
than in female unemployment (29%). The impact of the recession is 
therefore more uneven than the differences in the overall rates 
suggest. 
In some parts of Scotland, then, the future not 
duals and families but of whole communities has been blighted by 
recession. In Strathclyde in particular the prospects of an 
turn to work for many of the unemployed must be very dismal 
reflecting the sharp falls which have occurred in industrial ou 
and employment. The plight of such deprived communities has 
discovered" by the present Government thanks largely to the 
city riots which have occurred south of the border. The 
social disruption and high unemployment has been reluctantly 
ledged though so far without bringing any significant change 
Government policy. The suggestion still has currency that despite 
its malignant social effects unemployment is the 
to be paid for long-term economic recovery. That this 
broadcast with apparent equanimity reveals much about the 
of gross injustices in our midst. In the name of efficiency 
Government has pursued policies which have imposed a severe 
on some sections of society. And yet, as we shall now go on 
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the Government has failed to realise its main monetary goals and such 
gains as have been made may well prove ephemeral. 
2. The monetarist approach. 
A recent editorial in the Scottish Economic Bulletin (published 
by the Scottish Economic Planning Department) presents a remarkably 
succinct and splendidly bland appraisal of the Scottish situation: 
one need look no further than the 'international recession and the 
need to pursue a firm anti-inflation policy at home' for an explana-
tion of our present predicament(l9 ). Unemployment is a result of the 
world recession - this familiar yet obscure claim seems to legitimate 
high unemployment. One can hardly lay at the door of Westminster 
still less the Scottish Office - the intractable problems of the 
world economy (especially when the Arabs can be blamed for raising 
the price of oil by 130% in nominal terms in 1979-1981). As for a 
firm anti-inflation policy: what could be more reasonable? No 
government could tolerate the socio-economic (and political!) re-
percussions of uncontrolled inflation. After all, other industrialis-
ed countries are in the same boat and pursue similar tight fiscal 
and monetary policies in an effort to curb inflation. 
But hold on a moment. If the industrialised countries are all in 
the same boat - or rather, are all in the same sort of boat - why 
does the British boat sink so much faster than the others? A crude 
comparison of international unemployment rates indicates that unem-
ployment has risen particularly fast in Britain and is now very high 
by international standards (Table 3). 
TABLE 3 
Unemployment rates for selecced industrial countries, 
approximating U.S. concepts, seasonally adjusted, 1970-1981 
United Great 









































Sources: Constance Sorrentino 'Unemployment in international pers-
pective' in The Workless State, Shawler B & Sinfield A. (ed) 
Martin Robertson, 1981 and Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. 
Dept of Labor. 
9.5 
A more complex comparison of trends in labour supply, employment 
creation and long-term unemployment rates over the 1970's would do 
little to modify this gloomy picture(
2o). Even though the trend in 
industrialised countries is upward and some countries have reached 
(for them) historically high levels of unemployment, the world re-
cession provides at best a partial explanation of British- and 
Scottish - unemployment. The "rising cost of energy has certainly 
curtailed output in the industrialised countries. But while indus-
trial and manufacturing output has plummeted in the United Kingdom, 
other countries have escaped with only a moderation in their growth 
rates. A fine irony, this, as of all the industrialised countries 
the United Kingdom, with its self-sufficiency in oil, should be 
well placed to cope with the OPEC price increases. Indeed, 
world 
trade in manufacturing grew by ~ during 1980, helping to maintain 
(and indeed to increase) the volume of British exports despite a 
decline in competitiveness( 2l). Thus one can hardly blame domestic 
problems on a decline in external demand due to international re-
cession. All in all, this provides a convenient but unconvincing 
explanation of domestic unemployment. 
Let us look more closely, though, at 'the need to 
anti-inflation policy at home'. No one could deny that the Govern-
ment has had to confront serious inflation at least partly of its
own making through the iniquitous taxation policies introduced in 
its May 1979 budget. If the need is indisputable, are the policies 
for curbing inflation equally self-evident? Not at any rate to the 
364 economists who in the spring of 1981 took the exceptional step 
of issuing a public statement condemning Government policy(
22
). 
the House of Commons Treasury Committee(
23
) the economists were de-
rided for failing to agree on a workable alternative. But this was 
the point: there is no single and simple way of dealing with in-
flation. Many policies are required, pursued pragmatically and ad-
justed according to circumstance, and in particular according to 
their implications for other and perhaps competing objectives. 
The Government, in contrast, has adopted a simple, good 
keeping approach. The March 1980 budget introduced for the first 
time medium term monetary targets which were intended 'to bring 
down the rate of inflation and to create conditions for a 
able growth of output and employment 1 (
24
). To do this, the govern-
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ment planned to reduce the increase in money supply (M3) from some-
where between 7-11% for 1980-1 to nearer 4-8% in 1983-4. This was to 
be achieved by reducing the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
(PSBR) from 5% of GDP in 1979-80 to 3%% for 1980-1 and 1~ in 1983-
4. Public spending was to be cut back by 4% in volume terms between 
1979-80 and 1983-4, while interest rates were pushed to an historic 
high with The Minimum Lending Rate at 17% at the start of 1980 and 
falling only gradually since then. This in turn enhanced the value 
of the Pound already inflated not by industrial strength but by the 
wealth of oil reserves in the North Sea- the exchange rate rising 
by o/~ in 1979 and a further 13% in 1980( 25 ). 
The consequences of these policies are well known. Combined 
with relatively rapid domestic inflation (average earnings were up 
20% in 1980) the appreciation of sterling led to a deterioration in 
industrial competitiveness - estimated at 40% in the year to Novem-
ber 1980 - unparalleled since the infamous return to the Gold Stan-
dard in the 1920 1 s(
26 l. The depressed state of the Scottish fishing 
industry provides a telling example. With the appreciation of ster-
ling against the guilder over 1980 (in the order of 27%) Scottish 
boats were no longer able to compete with Dutch imports even landing 
their fish at minimum withdrawal prices< 27 l. Though landings in 
Scotland increased by 9% in the first nine months of 1980 compared 
with the previous year, the value of the catch fell by 6%- a fall 
of about £50 for each tonne landed( 28 l. Nor was it simply inefficient 
boats which were affected. For example, the two most modern trawellers 
in Peterhead were laid up because they could no longer meet the high 
cost of interest repayments(
29 l. With profit margins squeezed by 
rising costs and reduced competitiveness, high interest rates led 
to severe liquidity problems in fishing and other industries. The 
result was a massive process of destocking. Industry ran down stocks 
- mainly of materials, fuel and work in progress - to the tune of 
a record £2 billion over 1980, with more to come as destocking of 
finished goods caught up during the course of 1981( 31 ). Destocking 
and the attendant decline in orders was the most important immed-
iate cause of rising unemployment during 1980. 
Such is the price of a 'firm anti-inflation policy'. What of 
the gains? The Government has failed to achieve its targets for 
public spending, PSBR and the money supply. The recession itself, 
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in lost revenues and a rising social security bill, has contributed 
significantly to increased public spending. Local authority spending 
has out-run Government targets, while central government itself has 
not been immune from "over-spending", especially in the areas of in-
dustry and defence. During the first half of 1980, current spending 
increased by 1.3% against a planned fall of -0.2%(
31
). The borrowing 
requirement for 1980-81 now looks set to top £13.5 billion against 
an initial target of £8.5 billion later revised to £11.5 billion in 
November 1980( 32 ). As for the money supply, it grew by 21% in the 
year to February 1981, and although the underlying rate was rather 
less than this it was still way above the planned target for 1980-81 
of between 7 and 11%(
33
). 
It is in the area that it regards as most crucial - curbing the 
rate of inflation - that the Government could claim most success. 
In the year to February 1981 inflation ran at 13%, returning from a 
peak of above 20% to the level of mid-1979 when the government first 
assumed office( 34 l. Yet this success cannot be attributed to the 
Government's monetary strategy. It is the high exchange rate which 
has cheapened imports and the recession which has moderated pay 
settlements which have reduced the inflation rate. Whether these 
gains will survive a lowering of the exchange rate and easing of 
cession must be doubtful. Already the Government was obliged in its 
March 1981 budget to bolster economic activity through 
the interest rate and a fall in the value of sterling. The Govern-
ment could take some comfort from the single figure pay settlements 
which became the norm in the private sector. 
settlements dropped sharply, the trend in the public sector proved 
more resilient to the pressures of recession. Significantly, in the
year to October 1980, the usual pattern of manufacturing earnings 
being higher than the average for the whole economy has been re-
versed(35l. Though the downward trend in earnings was unmistakable, 
the Government had yet to realise its ambitions in the 
- and the fate of Government policy must depend on pay 
once the recession begins to ease. 
This is not the only question mark hanging over 
Even if the Government proves successful in reducing 
is not clear that this will produce the desired result of ' 
growth in output and employment'. The Government assumes both 
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falling inflation will restore industrial competitiveness and that 
falling interest rates will encourage industrial investment. How-
ever, it has been argued that the effect of a falling inflation 
rate on competitiveness may be offset to some extent by a consequent 
strengthening of sterling(
36
l. As for investment, this responds pri-
marily to demand not to the availability of cheap credit- as the 
case of Linwood, closed because of collapsing demand rather than a 
lack of investment funds, makes tragically clear( 37 >. Could invest-
ment be expected to respond to falling rates of inflation and inter-
est attained through a savage deflationary package of the kind intro-
duced in the March 1981 budget? In fact investment is forecast to 
fall significantly during 1981}
38
) a situation exacerbated by the 
Government's own predilection for cutting back on capital rather 
than current spending in its efforts to reduce public expenditure. 
In the long run, falling investment can only result in a further 
deterioration in competitiveness and a return to still higher rates 
of inflation. 
While the Government's policy has certainly exacted and will 
continue to exact a high and damaging toll in high unemployment, its 
monetary targets have proved unattainable and its success in reducing 
inflation threatens to prove short-lived. The monetarist "experiment" 
has rendered the economic and social problems of our society more not 
less intractable. With the continuing expansion of the population of 
working age over the next decade, the outlook for the unemployed in 
Scotland seems particularly bleak. For as we shall argue in the folkw-
ing section, the pace of employment generation in Scotland had des-
pite oil developments slackened significantly even before the current 
recession. This partly reflected the declining impact of regional 
policy. By the end of the 1970's unemployment was already established 
as the most pernicious and intractable problem facing Scottish soc-
iety. 
3. Long-term trends in Scottish employment and unemployment. 
In the early post-war period unemployment in Scotland typically 
stood at about twice the U.K. average. Employment generation in the 
Scottish economy was poor even by U.K. standards. Had Scotland matched 
the U.K. performance then some 200,000 (about 10%) more jobs would 
have been created in the 1950's and early 1960's( 39 l. But in the mid-
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1960's this changed. Between 1964 and 1970 the manufacturing sector 
in Scotland did better than in the U.K. as a whole(
4
0) - a change in 
fortune generally attributed to regional policy. "Immigrant" firms 
in industries like electrical engineering and clothing were attracted
to Scotland. At the same time, traditional industries such as coal 
and steel were contracting, so that by 1970 the Scottish industrial 
structure had come to resemble the rest of the U.K.'s(
4
l). Indeed 
the Research Institute of the Scottish Council for Development and 
Industry could claim in the early 1970's that 'for 
country with a population of 5 million the Scottish economy is 
ably diversified'( 42 l. Moore and Rhodes suggest that regional policy 
brought some 70- 80 thousand jobs to Scotland in this period(
43 l. 
Nevertheless, the rate of change in total employment in Scotland 
tween 1964 and 1970 was much the same as the U.K.'s. The fall in 
Scotland/Great Britain unemployment relative from 207 in 1965 to 
168 in 1970 was largely the result of continued outmigration(
44 l. 
TABLE 4 
Scottish Employment and Unemployment in the 1970's 
1980 ~::~s~ 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80I·~----
Employment: 
manufacturing 708 l-39 -26 +14 +19 -39 -29 +7 -6 -7 -47 
Employment: 
total 2058 I-ss -14 +61 +34 -8 -5 0 -4 +10 -50 
Unemployment: 
total 88 1+34 +10 -33 -14 +21 +40 +24 +1 -3 +34 
the figures in thousands, are for June of each year, or for 
change from the previous June. 
the unemployment figures are seasonally adjusted, excluding 
school leavers. 
Sources: Department of Employment Gazettes and the Scottish Econom~
Bulletin. 
The Scottish employment figures for the 1970's (Table 4) show 
pronounced cycles, with a boom in 1972-4, stagnation between 1976-9 
and recessions in 1970-2, 1974-6 and from 1979 onwards. Still the 
trend in Scottish employment does change significantly between the 
first and second half of the decade, and in a way which contrasts 
with the experience in the rest of the U.K. Between 1970 and 1975 
Scotland experienced some growth in industrial production 
in total employment (0.8%). In the U.K. as a whole, there 
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or no growth in either. After 1975 the position was reversed. There 
was no growth in Scottish industrial production (1975-9) and only 
0.3% growth in Scottish employment (1976-9). In the U.K. industrial 
output grew by 4.3% while employment in Great Britain grew by 1.2%<45 ~ 
The employment growth for Scotland in the first half of the de-
cade was generated in the boom of 1972-4. However, only half the in-
crease in employment showed up in reduced unemployment. The other 
half fed an increase in the Scottish working population( 46 ) follow-
ing a decline in outmigration and a rise in the economic activity 
rate for women. The latter continued through the subsequent recess-
ion in 1974-6 as service jobs continued to expand. Total employment 
therefore fell very little during that recession, though unemploy-
ment still rose because of job losses in manufacturing. The relative 
success of the Scottish economy between 1970 and 1976 was registered 
in the Scotland/Great Britain unemployment relative which fell from 
168 to 125, its lowest ever level< 47 l. 
The main cause of Scotland's employment growth in the early 
1970's seems to have been the North Sea Oil discoveries, which in-
volved not only the emergence of an oil industry (by 1976 worth some 
25,000 jobs) but also a boost to employment in construction, engin-
eering, steel, chemicals and also services of various kinds( 48 l. Much 
of this expansion occurred in overseas-owned firms, maintaining a 
trend established in the late 1960's when regional policy effects 
were strongest. It is estimated that by 1975 17.5% of Scottish manu-
facturing employment was in overseas owned firms compared with 13% 
for U.K. manufacturing. In the case of electronics, the proportion of 
Scottish employment in overseas-owned firms was over half( 49 l. 
While oil-related developments helped to maintain output and 
jobs in the latter part of the 1970 1 s, this only compensated for a 
general weakening in Scottish economic activity, especially in manu-
facturing. Over the decade 100,000 jobs in manufacturing were lost 
and its share of total employment fell from 34% to 29%. Without oil 
the position would have been much worse. For example, in the tradi-
tional Scottish industry of mechanical engineering output fell by 
15% and employment fell from 98,000 to 82,000 between 1975 and 1979. 
It is estimated that without oil employment would have fallen to 
65,300(
50
). Employment in companies wholly involved in oil-related 










and including the indirect impact the figure rises to some 70-
80 thousand jobs in 1979(Sl)_ Nevertheless industrial output and 
total employment remained static and as the working population con-
tinued to rise until 1977 this involved a further increase in unem-
ployment. By 1979 the Scotland/Great Britain relative had slipped 
back to 143. 
Obviously regional policy has not stimulated activity and em-
ployment in the 1970's in the way it did in the late 1960's. Why 
not? One reason is the scarcity of mobile industrial capital seek-
ing investment opportunities - and the greater competition for what 
investment is available (thus the growing concern in Scotland over 
Ireland's tax and subsidy incentives). Moreover, regional policy 
was expanded in the 1960's on the grounds (forcefully argued in 
Scotland) that labour shortages which were impeding economic growth 
could be circumvented by tapping labour reserves in the develop-
ment areas. Since the recession in the mid-1970's labour has been 
more plentiful throughout Britain and firms are under little 
to relocate to find workers. Indeed labour is more plentiful every-
where and the flow of international investment to Scotland has great-
ly diminished since 1975( 52 ). Also within the U.K. firms can often 
obtain subsidies from industrial policy funds for investment in 
areas which do not qualify for regional incentives(
53
l. Perhaps for 
these reasons, Conservative ministers have been surprisingly active 
(given their professed belief in market forces) in their efforts to 
attract and maintain investment in Scotland, as Lionel Barber shows 
in another paper in this volume. And the political salience of the 
issue is underlined by the fact that the Select Committee on Sco 
Affairs chose "the attraction of inward investment" as the topic 
for their first major investigation. Their report and the Govern-
ment's response are analysed by Neil Hood and Stephen Young later 
in the Yearbook. 
In fact, spending on regional preferential assistance to in-
dustry in Scotland has been declining even in money terms since 
1976/7 when the Regional Employment Premium was removed(S
4
). But 
the level of spending in 1975/6 and 1976/7 (over £200 million to 
Scotland) was not far off the equivalent in real 
year 1969/70. And it is now widely recognised that regional prefer-
ence might be better measured by looking at all public expenditure 
102 
for industry and employment. Calculated per head o£ population, this 
statistic is still very much in Scotland's favour compared with Eng-
land - being respectively £79 to £27 in 1977/78, £75 to £34 in 1978/9 
and £73 to £37 in 1979/80(ss)_ So it is doubtful i£ the reduced scale 
o£ assistance has significantly contributed to the declining impact 
of regional policy in the 1970's. 
On the other hand, the inefficiency o£ regional assistance has 
been widely attacked. Fraser and Orton, for example, have questioned 
the value £or Scottish employment between 1975 and 1979 o£ the major 
form o£ regional assistance, regional develop~ent grants( 56 l. These 
grants are investment subsidies paid to any firm or industry regard-
less o£ the return or employment impact, so long as the investment is 
in a Development Area (as was almost all o£ Scotland in this period). 
The two industrial sectors benefitting most in the period were oil 
and chemicals, and metal manufacture (mainly steel) - both highly 
capital intensive. Oil and chemicals benefitted by £58 million 
(21.6% o£ grant outlays) but employment didn't increase at all as 
a direct result. Metal manufacture benefitted by £49 million (18.2% 
o£ all grants) and employment £ell £rom 43,000 to 35,000. The areas 
receiving most in regional grants were those with large-scale devel-
opments in these or similar industries (e.g. Motherwell, Glasgow, 
Falkirk/Grangemouth and Cunninghame) but none showed much change in 
their unemployment rate over the period. Fraser and Orton argue that 
money could be spent more effectively i£ grants were discretionary 
and related to prospects for employment generation and economic re-
turns. They could then be withheld in cases where investment would 
proceed in any case because o£ locational needs, or where the firm's 
resources were substantial. It is worth noting that manufacturers in 
Scotland spend 40% more per head o£ population on fixed investment 
than in the U.K. as a whole, and yet growth in total output is i£ 
anything slower and employment losses greater< 57 l. 
In its present form, then, and especially in the current clim-
ate, regional policy can only have a limited impact on Scottish em-
ployment. Assuming also that the number o£ jobs created thanks to 
oil-related developments will decline over the 1980's, the pros-
pects for employment generation in Scotland look particularly bleak. 
Scottish economic activity was already weakening in the latter part 
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of the 1970's, a trend much exacerbated, of course, by the current 
recession. We have already considered (in section 1) the overall im-
pact this has had on levels of employment and the numbers out of 
To consider the full implications of rising unemployment on Scottish 
society, though, we now need to look at its unequal impact on diff-
erent sections of the community. 
4. The unegual impact of unemployment on Scottish society. 
The Young 
The rise in youth unemployment at an even faster rate than the 
rise in overall unemployment has provoked a controversy as to whether 
youth unemployment is caused by special factors. However, a thorough 
study of this by Peter Makeham for the Department of Employment(
58
) 
reached the conclusion that 'those conditions which produce high ov-
erall unemployment produce high youth unemployment' and that other 
explanations (such as changes in occupational and industrial struc-
ture or the narrowing of pay differentials between youths and adults) 
are insignificant. Makeham found that as the unemployment rate for 
all males changes (up or down) by 1% then the teenage male rate chan-
ges on average by 1.7%; and as the rate for all females changes by 
1%, the teenage female rate changes on average by 3%. 
The importance of general unemployment levels for the employment 
of the young suggests that the number of school leavers without qual-
ifications is not an important factor, even though these youngsters 
are most likely to be unemployed. Being without both experience and 
qualifications, they face the depressing outlook of being at the end 
of the queue for jobs and •seeing the queue growing longer but their 
position in it remaining the same•(
59 l. Over 30% of Scottish school-
leavers have no SCE or GCE certificates, a much higher figure than 
in England( 60 l. One response is to seek more post-school training, 
as suggested in the MSC's consultative paper 'New Initiatives', 
which the Scottish CBI Director has warmly welcomed(
61
). But though 
training is important, it can easily do more to affect who gets jobs 
than to increase the number of jobs. Enthusiasm for training is also 
very much a function of who pays for it, as youngsters seeking app-
renticeships in Scotland have been findin9. In spite of growing MSC 
support-funding apprentice intakes in engineering, shipbuilding and 
road transport have dropped from 2042, 847 and 1543 respectively in 
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in 1976-7 to 1660, 362 and 900 in 1980-1( 62 ). John Fairley examines 
the dismal prospects for industrial training in Scotland more fully 
elsewhere in this Yearbook. 
The Government's main response to youth unemployment- indeed, 
to unemployment in general - ha~ been the Youth Opportunities Pro-
gr~~e. The Programme has expanded very rapidly. In 1978-9, its first 
full year, YOP schemes provided for 23,600 unemployed young people 
in Scotland(
63 l. In 1981-2 the MSC are seeking 66,000 places in Scot-
land, not only for the expected unemployed (over 1 in 2) amongst 
the 90,000 school-leavers, but also for thousands of those who left 
school in 1980 but still find themselves unemployed( 64 l. The Youth 
Opportunities Programme tries to keep up with the demand, particular-
ly from current school-leavers. The MSC hopes to offer all of them a 
place before they have been unemployed six months - but it cannot 
keep up with the unemployment of those a little older. Already over 
half of those completing their YOP scheme (on average in six months) 
find only unemployment follows<
65 l. Unemployment is high even ~~ongst 
young people in their 20's. The unemployment rates by age group in 
January 1981 {G.B. figures) were as follows: under 18s 1~; 18-19 
year olds 17%; 20-24 year olds 15%; 25-34 year olds 10%( 66 ). And 
by age 19 two-fifths of the unemployed had been out of work in their 
present spell for more than six months and nearly one fifth for over 
a year. Moreover, MSC projections envisage a further 60% increase in 
the under 18 unemployed between early 1981 and early 1982( 67 ). 
The Goverlli~ent has grudgingly acknowledged that this depressing 
picture contributes to the alienation of the disadvanta9ed young 
people apparent in the riots in London, Liverpool and other English 
cities in the summer of 1981. One wonders if Scottish cities will be 
next? The riots have concentrated the Government's mind on youth un-
employment at last and at the moment of writing it is considering 
either a big expansion along the lines of YOP's work preparation 
courses, plus training courses in place of apprenticeships, or a job 
subsidy scheme fo~ young workers. However, although either could be 
valuable {depending on their precise form), it is worth stressing 
that Makeh~m's research suggests that demand reflation would be more 
successful in creating jobs for the young than would Government mea-
sures aimed at the young alone. 
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Female unemployment increased from 25,000 in 1971 to 78,000 in 
1980( 68 ). This meant an absolute increase of 50,000 which was the 
same as the increase for males over the period. But proportionately 
the rise was much greater for women - a threefold increase compared 
with an increase of a half. This was against a background of rising 
employment for women (an increase of some 85,000 jobs) whereas male 
employment was falling. However, it seems that this job expansion 
very largely in part-time jobs, which had reached some 322,000 in 
1979( 69 ). Public services and distribution in particular have expand-
ed their employment of part-timers. On the other hand, the demand for 
full-time women workers has fallen, particularly in the recessions 
of 1974-6 and since 1979. As the number of women seeking full-time 
jobs has-continCied to expand (as well as those seeking part-time 
jobs) unemployment for women has risen steeply. By January 1981 it 
had reached -~3, 900. To some extent, this figure represents women 
gistering as unemployed when they would not have done so before. 
But the fall in full-time jobs means there has been a real increase 
in female unemployment as well. 
Female unemployment is proportionately higher in Scotland than 
in Britain as a w~1.ole, the respective rates in January 1981 being 
9.8% and 7%( 70 ). The MSC in their Scottish plan suggest that it 
probably continue to rise more steeply than male unemployment. 
theless, it is :~ale unemployment which has so far risen faster 
current recession. Two reasons in particular can be offered £or thi 
the importance of ma~ufacturing job losses in the 
and the tendency for many women, notably those in part-time jobs, 
leave the labour market when they lose their job rather than to 
register as unemployed. It is worth noting that although men 
in total more manufacturing redundancies than women, studies of 
earlier recessions( 7 l) ha'Je fo:.tnd that those women who did hold 
dustrial jobs experience proportioC~ately 9reater employment losses 
than men. 
The belief is strong in Scotland that women's unemployment 
less important than men's unemployment and that when jobs are 
women should give up their jobs to 
probably underestimates the effect of women's unemployment on 
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A high proportion of unemployed women are single. And a study by 
that there would be much more poverty amongst 
it were not for women 1 s wages ( 72 ). Wnile many 
obliged to sacrifice their jobs (willingly or 
Townsend has shown 
parent families if 




erwise) to protect male employment, the cost they bear in terms 
poverty or lost opportunities should not be underestimated. 
of 
The long-term '.memployed 
The hardest hit by S2otland 1 s rising unemployment are the long-
term unemployed. As we have seen, in Jane1ary 1981 120,000 Scots had 
been out-of-work over six months and nearly 60,000 out-of-work for 
over a year. Moreover the figures for long-term unemployment are 
boCind to rise steeply in 1981-2 as the sharp rise in unemployment 
amoC~9st men during the latter half of 1980 begins to affect the 
lon9er-term duration categories. 
The long-term unemployed are predominantly unskilled manual 
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As Table 5 shows well over half of unemployed men aged 50 and above 
have been out of work for more than six months, and over a third for 
more than a year. But even for the younger age groups {19-34) some 
two-fifths (or 35,000) unemployed men have been out of work for 
over six months. Inevitably many of those suffering the problems and 
deprivations of long-term unemployment have families to support. 
Evidence for the predominance of unskilled and manual workers 
amongst the unemployed comes in the occupational breakdown of the 
registered unemployed. This is illustrated in table 6 which also 
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'Ill·• J I: 
TABLE 6 
Unemployment and the ratio of unemployed 
to vacancies by occupational category in Scotland, 
December 1980. 
Occupational category 
Managerial & professional 
Clerical & related 
Other non-manual 





















Department of Employment Gazette & authors' calculations. 
brings out the acute shortage of jobs for those classified as 
labourers. The 37% of the unemployed so classified represents 
men and women. 
Daniel has remarked that 'the number of people entering unem-
ployment contributes little to the total: what matters is how long 
they stay unemployed .•• the current record level of unemployment is 
primarily due to record lengths of time out of work 1 (
73
). Although 
redundancies have increased, there has been a fall in the 
people becoming unemployed for other reasons, such as 
ing. But unskilled and lowpaid workers are still much more likely 
become unemployed than other categories. They also have always on 
average spent longer spells out-of-work, 
become much worse, especially for the older and less fit. What 
vacancies there are, tend to be taken by those who are younger or 
have qualifications - or by those who have been more recently in 
and are preferred by employers for that reason. The forecasts of 
ing unemployment present a deadening prospect for those who have 
ready been out-of-work for months and years. 
Tragically - and shamefully - the already inadequate resources 
to assist the growing number of victims of public policy are being 
reduced still further. For instance in their latest Plan for Scot-
land\74) the MSC are forced to reduce their staff levels in the 
Employment Service Division - mainly the job centres - from 1604 in 
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April 1980 to 1362 in April 1984. Among the schemes to be abandoned 
is the Special Employment Needs scheme to help the long-term unemploy-
ed. The Plan notes that its figures do not reflect the further cuts 
proposed in the Public Expenditure White Paper of March 1981 nor the 
cutbacks which may follow the Rayner report recommending voluntary 
registration at job centres for the unemployed( 75 ). The serious im-
plications of that recommendation for the positive role of job cen-
tres in helping the unemployed has been spelt out by Daniel( 76 ). 
There is one MSC programme for the long-term unemployed which is 
planned to expand, the Co~~unity Enterprise Programme replacing the 
Special Temporary Employment Programme. This has a new target for 
Scotland of 4,700 places- but that is an expansion after an initial 
cut-back and still means very small scale provision indeed for the 
rising numbers of long-term unemployed( 77 ). 
Also totally - and increasingly - inadequate is the benefit 
system for the long-term unemployed. It pays to be declared unfit 
for work for Unemployment Benefit gives out after a year whilst 
Invalidity Benefit continues. A majority of the unemployed are 
forced to depend on Supplementary Benefit. But the unemployed on 
Supplementary Benefit never get the long-term rate to which other 
claimants are entitled after a year. The result is that 'the long-
term unemployed are generally among the very poorest in Britain 
today•(
78
). They typically had lowpaid jobs when they were in work, 
have a poverty line existence on benefit, and, if they do get fur-
ther work (perhaps after the prodding of the benefit police, the 
expanded corps of Unemployment Review Officers) it will be more of 
the same: lowpaid and insecure. 
5. Alternatives to high unemployment. 
So long as we tolerate - or merely repress - the damaging re-
percussions of high unemployment, then Scottish society can be justly 
criticised as both unequal and inhumane. Since high unemployment is 
hard to justify it is no surprise to find in recent defences of Gov-
ernment policy a stress on the need to reduce inflation as a means 
of tackling unemployment. High unemployment must be accepted now in 
order to avoid it in the future - the doublethink of 1984 is already 
with us. Yet, as we have seen, the Government has failed to achieve 













to prove short-lived. W.>y does the Government pursue so single-
mindedly a policy which damages so much while promisin9 so little? 
However dogmatic the claims of its spokesmen, the adoption of a mone-
tarist stance by the present Go'Jernment has li.ttle to do with its 
status as a "scientific" theory - as the 364 economists referred to 
earlier were at pains to point out. While economic theory provides a 
rationale for action, there are as many theories as there are econo-
mists. Whatever the questionable merits of monetarist theory, then, 
we would suggest that its currency in contemporary politics lies 
rather in its accord with certain prevailing political and administra-
tive values. 
For one thing, monetarist doctrine coincides neatly with the 
political prejudices of modern Conservatism. Policy is aimed against 
two targets which have not enjoyed much popularity in Conservative 
(or indeed in wider) circles in recent years; the unions and the 
Welfare State. It is no coincidence, of course, that these are the 
main (though in fact very limited) redistributive institutions of 
our society. In the costs of welfare and the pay demands of organ-
ised labour the Government sees the source of the inflationary pre-
ssures which it believes are the main long-term threat to the 
The present policy of cutting back on pay and ~::mblic spending is 
supposed to provide, therefore, a permanent solution to the country' 
economic problems. If the Government's "solution" to date has invol 
high costs with few tangible benefits, the alluring goal of a 
solution nevertheless provides a seductive rationale for persisting 
with a policy which at least satisfies the Government's own prejud-
ices. 
Yet it would be wrong to attribute the biases of present policy 
to Conservative prejudices and leave it at that. The Government pre-
sumably has Treasury support, and while the Treasury is not immune 
from political bias (far from it) we suspect the strength of the 
present commitment to monetarism is deep-rooted in the Treasury's 
experience of economic management over the past decade. In particu-
lar the idea has taken hold that public spending offers a pernicious
neatly and potentially disastrous means of reducing unemployment 
reversing the Keynsian orthodoxy of earlier post-war years. 
inflationary peaks of the mid-1970's were attributed to lax 
policies adopted ~y a Conservative Government willing to spend its 
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way out of recession. The incomes policy of the incoming Labour Gov-
ernment, in the form of the Social Contract, was seen as exacerba-
ting rather than reducing the inflationary tide. This period of ec-
onomic management in the mid-1970's was crucial in establishing a 
belief in the dangers of public spending, while the erosion and sub-
sequent collapse of the Social Contract in later years was taken as 
the deathknell of incomes policy as a means of controlling inflation. 
Central to present policy is the assumption that inflation ar-
ises from a growth in the money supply, which in turn is attributed 
to increases in borrowing required to finance public spending. Assum-
ing the effects of changes in the money supply on inflation occur 
with a two year lag, this view fits the experience of the mid-1970's 
remarkably well. Allowing for the time lag, average annual increases 
in the money supply (M3) explain average annual increases in the 
money value of GNP in the U.K., according to Kaldor, 'with quite 
remarkable precision•( 79 l. Yet Kaldor also points out that this 
occurrence was unique, not paralleled either in other periods in the 
U.K. nor in the experience of other countries. Overall the evidence 
fails to support any systematic correlation between money supply and 
inflation, with or without a two year lag. 
Nor does Kaldor find much support for another major plank of 
government policy, 'that public sector borrowing has made a major 
contribution to the excessive growth in the money supply in recent 
years'. In fact the growth of the money supply in recent years has 
been at its lowest (1975-6) in the very year when unfunded PSBR was 
at its highest,and at its highest (1977-8) when unfunded PSBR was ac-
tually negative: Kaldor suggests that from 1966-1979 changes in the 
money supply are explained much more by bank lending to the private 
sector (83%) than by unfunded PSBR (only 5%). In particular, the grow-
th of the money supply in the mid-1970's can be attributed to the un-
controlled growth in private sector bank lending following the adop-
tion of the Competition and Credit Control System by the Bank of 
England in 1971. On the other hand, inflation in the same period can 
be attributed largely to world commodity. price rises (especially oil) 
which were in turn exacerbated by the threshold agreements providing 
automatic compensation to incomes during Phase III of the Conserva-
tive Government's incomes policy. Though it continues to exercise a 






£lation and monetary expansion in the Barber years is no more than 
coincidence; or, as Kaldor puts it, 'a pure fluke'. 
The other major element in economic management in the 1970's, 
incomes policy, has also been subject to much misinterpretation. The 
Social Contract did collapse in the ignominy o£ Labour's "Winter o£ 
Discontent"- but not before it had achieved significant results 
easily comparable with those o£ current policy. For example, the 
annual increase in earnings in manufacturing industry was reduced 
from 31.8% in lQ 1975 to 8.7% in 3Q 1977. The subseqJent collapse 
of the Social Contract was widely regarded as evidence o£ the in-
ability o£ incomes policy to provide a long-term solution to the 
problem o£ inflation. In the long-run, o£ course, we are all dead 
an assertion by Keynes which even his now fashionable critics would 
find hard to deny! In any case, a more reasoned interpretation would 
surely stress the Labour Government's inability to maintain the poli-
tical conditions in which agreement could be secured over control o£ 
incomes. This was not unconnectEid with Labour's own avowal o£ a mone-
tarist approach. In 1976, at the instigation o£ the IMF, the Labour 
Gover~~ent accepted the need to reduce PSBR 'so as to 
tary conditions which would help the growth o£ output and the 
of in£lation'(BO). With Labour accepting high unemployment as the 
necessary price o£ controlling inflation, and cutting back on 
spending (£ired with enthusiasm £or the then influential Bacon & 
Eltis thesis on unproductive state spending(Bl))the political 
tions £or a sustained incomes policy no longer obtained. 
A peculiar combination o£ administrative empiricism and mone-
tarist zeal has brought the present gover~~ent to a position where 
can claim no option than to pursue savagely deflationary policies 
even in t~J.e depths o£ recession. •There is no alternative' - this 
become the stock phrase o£ the Government and the Scottish 
unemployment rises inexorably towards levels comparable with the 
of the 1930's. Forgetting £or the moment the effrontery 
a policy o£ mass unemployment as an "alternative", we should be 
that the Government is in a hole entirely o£ its own making. For 
a.lternatives are many and various, and on any reasonabl-e account 
would include serious consideration of both incomes policies and 
pr~gr~mmes of public spending. 
A substantial and growing body o£ opinion now advocates some 
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form of reflation as a policy for tackling unemployment. While re-
flation in some shape or form seems indispensible, it is clear that 
other policies are needed too. A re£lationary policy does not it-
self address the industrial and socio-economic problems underlying 
the long-term deterioration in Scottish (and U.K.) performance re-
lative to other industrial countries. In the short-term - because o£ 
that uncompetitiveness reflation brings dangers o£ a sharp fall in 
the value o£ sterling, a substantial increase in imports and a surge 
in inflation £or which additional policies are needed. The most basic 
of these is, as we have implied, an incomes policy. We believe the 
Social Contract deserves another try in more promising political con-
ditions, such as might accompany a re£lationary approach and more 
interventionist and redistributive social and industrial policies. 
Also needed in the short-term would be some devaluation and the re-
imposition o£ exchange controls. Generalised import controls might be 
held in reserve to limit any growth in imports which reflation might 
unleash. It would also be worth looking for methods o£ reflation which 
would involve minimum damage (and maximum benefit) to the balance o£ 
payments. 
We have to recognise that a re£lationary strategy can neither 
create new jobs in sufficient numbers overnight, nor create them in 
exactly the places and occupations where they are most needed. As 
Peston (and others) have pointed out, unemployment will remain a pro-
blem o£ immense proportions throughout the 1980's whatever macro-
economic approaches are pursued(
82
). And we have to try to reverse 
the long-term industrial decline. Consequently social and industrial 
policies are also important in tackling unemployment both in the shor1 
and ic• the long run. 
Firn argues that Scottish industrial decline has its roots in 
'a failure o£ the indigenous industries within Scotland to move into 
new markets, technologies and £arms o£ organisation•(83 ). He points 
out that locally owned and controlled manufacturing enterprises are 
disproportionately concentrated in slower-growing industrial sectors 
characterised by a relative lack o£ large plants a;>d technological 
sophistication and a correspondingly low use o£ qualified manpower. 
This situation is not surprising given ~~ industrial strategy which 
ceatred ~n regional policies aimed primarily at reducing unemployment 
through attracting mobile capital. Fortunately, as the Research Insti-
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tute of the Scottish Council (Development and Industry) point out, 
accent has since changed completely towards the introduction of 
products and processes in established firms(
84
). To its credit, 
Scottish Development Agency (SDA) has adopted a selective approach 
industrial development, with investment criteria 
profitability, promotion of employment, adequate quality of manage-
ment and support for technological advance(BS). Nevertheless, the 
SDA's spending is only a small part of public spending on industry 
Scotland, and there seems little prospect of the Agency expanding in 
either resources or scope in the present political climate. The Gov-
ern~ent's reaction to the evidence of the inefficacy of traditional 
regio:>al ind:1cements has been to reduce the size of development 
as a mea;>s of reducing public spending. Assistance to industry is 
still provided on criteria which give insufficient regard to the po-
tential for growth and employment. 
Even under the present Government, industrial policy has been 
dominated by social rather than economic considerations. Goverru"llent 
support is concentrated on preserving jobs in increasingly non-
competitive industries. Wnile job preservation ~ay be vital as a 
orary expedient (if only to lessen the devastatin9 results of 
ernment's own policies) the tragedy at Linwood underlines its 
adeq.1acy as a long-term solution. Yet the Govern~ent 1 s 
accept more than a minimalist, defensive posture means that in 
tion, while not inappropriate, is fragmented and spasmodic. In 
of a more positive and broadly based approach to industrial 
regeneration we find instead (as we have seen in the mining 
industries in recent months), an ad hoc and hesitant 
overwhelmin9 occupatio:>al and social pressures. 
Where recent goverru"llents have sought a more 
integrated policy it has been primarily within limited local con 
Area·-based policies beca:;ne fashionable in the 
the Partnership Schemes initiated in 1977 and 
recently introduced by the Conservative Government. In Scotland 
bank has been declared an Enterprise Zone 
see Jordan and Reilly's article elsewhere in The Yearbook), while 
Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) project launched with some fan-
fare in 1976 has been hailed as a fine example of what 
through an area-based approac:h. Certainly no one would 
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the achievements of GE&~, in ho:1sing rehabilitation and environmental 
improvement as well as the co:>structio:> and conversion of sites and 
plants for industrial use. However, one wonders whether similar re-
sults would have been attained in any case through orthodox channels. 
Donald and Hutton of the Glasgow College of Technology(
86
) comment 
rather cynically on the political motivations behind GEAR and in par-
ticular they co~plain that it diverts attention from the need for 
national policies to tackle problems like u:.employment. One trouble 
with an area-based approach is that it tends to assume there are 
area solutio:>s to urban Droblems. In a similar context in Tyneside 
----- (87) . • 
Hammer co"llpla1ns that an area-based approach can only have a 
marginal impact so lon9 as main-line policies co:1tinue to undermine 
the local economy and while local authorities remain hamstrung by 
the Government's refusal to allow the adoption of more extensive 
powers to intervene in local industry. 
What is needed is a Scottish industrial policy, backed by the 
resources of regional policy at its peak, but utilised much more di-
rectly to 9et labour and capital into high productivity industries. 
For this the Scottish Development Agency does provide a model, but 
one which needs to be built up as its expertise grows. The SDA is 
already showing that it can back local entrepreneurship for example 
in its New Ventures Unit and its role in the financial reconstruc-
tion of the Weir Engineering Group. Ind:1stries with opportunities in 
Scotland include food and drink, electronics, oil-related equipment, 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, tourism and 'even textiles'(BB). The en-
couragement of self-management of firms is another way forward. Pub-
lic sector industries need to be brou-;)ht positively into Scottish 
industrial policy along with the private sector. A.nd finally in 
support of industrial policy and because of their job generating po-
tential, should come positive support of services in Scotland, both 
public and private. Private services have been weaker in generating 
employment in Scotland than in the rest of Britain because of the 
decline of traditional services like warehousing, shipping, docks 
and transport( 89 ). It is important that the fast growing sections of 
services, financial and professional, should not be lost to London. 
T'1e take-over bids for the Royal Bank of Scotland provide a test 























All this implies a much more interventionist industrial st 
than currently obtains. Even the Fraser of Allander Institute (not 
renowned £or its advocacy of public intervention) complains in its 
Quarterly Eco~omic Review that industrial policy has been bedevilled
'Jy doctrinaire views of preservin<;:J or restoring the "proper balance" 
between private and public sectors - with insufficient regard to 
questions of efficiency or growth ( 90 ). Th1.1S the Government has 
ed tight cash limits on nationalised industries without regard 
their d~~aging effect on investment in Scotland's economic infra-
structure. Policies on public spending in Scotland have been myopic 
in the extreme. Education, housing and local authority spending were 
again cut in the March 1981 budget. The 
disregard of recent work which stresses the vital role o£ social 
vices in 'the reproduction of labour power•( 9 l)_ Certainly cuts in 
welfare and ~n training programmes do not augur well for the main-
tenance of Scotland's traditional asset, its skilled labour force. 
There is even a danger that any industrial recovery may be hampered 
by shortages of skilled labour. 
The other side of that particular coin is that 
employed may lack the opportunity or skills to take advantage of 
onO!nic recovery. This problem is especially acute for the large 
bers now suffering the additional deprivations and handicaps of 
term unemployment. The National Insurance scheme fails to 
adequate security against short-term unemployment for many 
while in the case of long-term unemployment it has never 
protection at all. Those unemployed for more than a year 
back on Supplementary Benefits. A first priority of any humane 
cy must surely be improvements in maintenance - for 
moving the one year limit on entitlement 
and by ceasing to exclude the unemployed from 
Benefit rates. Yet Gover~~ent policy (through 
tion of the earnings-related supplement and more Unemployment 
view Officers for ex~~le) has discriminated against the 
Perhaps the present administration subscribes to the popular 
that redundancy payments 
a general transformation in the circumstances of the unemployed -
though the evidence is plain that neither redundancy 




Income support is not enough. The opportunity to work is central 
to psychological and social as well as economic well-being i~ our soc-
iety. If that opportunity is to be genuine, then a range of pro9rammes 
will be needed to help overcome the cumulative disadvantage·experienc-
ed by those now excluded from the labour market. ~.atever the merits 
of the Youth Opportunities Pro9ramme in making unemployment more tol-
erable or in improving the job prospects of some youngsters (at the 
expense of others) the Government has given little heed to the equally 
if not more pressing problems of older age groups. Various forms of 
education and training for older workers suffering long-term unem-
ployment will be essential; a·s we have seen the present programme 
(CEP) is no more than a token gesture in that direction. 
Training opportunities are important, but more positive ways of 
finding work for the lon9-term unemployed (young and old) will also 
be required. The quota system for the disabled has never worked succ-
essfully- partly because it has never been properly enforced. A 
subsidy scheme could encourage employers to take on those suffering 
the acute disadvantages of disability or long-term unemployment (the 
two are not unrelated). But if their access to the labour market is 
not to be gained at the expense of others, some steps must be taken 
in the direction of sharing out the available work more fairly. 
Worksharing is no panacea but the Goverlli~ent too readily dismisses 
a worksharing approach on the general grounds of prohibitive cost 
or political infeasibility. Nevertheless worksharing offers the att-
ractive prospect of creating jobs in areas (low paid jobs with high 
overtime for example) where they are most in dem~~d. A more pragma-
tic approach would identify realistic opportunities for worksharing 
(e.g. in response to rising productivity) while seekin~ to distribute 
the costs more fairly, perhaps through some sort of levy or subsidy 
system. 
These are only some of the more obvious directions in which po-
licy could go. There are other, perhaps more imaginative, approaches 
(for ex~~ple, the possibilities of shared part-time employment) which 
also deserve more serious attention than they have received to date. 
These policies do have a price. But then, unemployment too has a 
price, and one which bears most heavily on the most disadvantaged 
sections of society. If it is intolerable to condemn people to spend 
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a considerable part or even all of the rest of their working 
employed (a:1d already in Scotland over 1 in 5 unemployed men 
50s have been out of work for over Z years) then the costs of such 
redistributive policies must be accepted. Moreover, the current 
session with costs ignores the pay-offs. A fair deal for the 
ed is central to greater security at work- and this in turn 
courage the adoption of more flexible and innovative approaches to 
dustrial change. Positive policies to deal with unemployment are 
just an interim measure to alleviate hardship but are themselves 
prerequisite of long-term economic recovery. 
The ultimate absurd·L ty of present Go·Jernment 
seeks cha:19e in industry and attitudes thr<>ugh recession. In fact, 
Stephen Maxwell argues, the conservatism of the Scottish character 
likely to increase in conseq'.lence(
93
). Recession breeds defensi 
and resistance to change. It does not eve" 
as voluntary job nobility (which is surely preferable) 
up as compulsory terminations increase. Recession also 
employers to look to the short-term only, cutting back 
and training which would :"lelp them innovate a"d compete in the 
Above all, though, recession creates a more divided 
a disadvantaged minority bears the costs of cha:1ge. 
pected ':•> bear most of the sacrifices will also enjoy the 
recovery must be doubtful. Scotland as a whole (and parts 
may bear a high price for 
of 'who benefits?' is not of course a new one in Scottish 
The previous decade was dominated by the oil issue before the 
over devolution eventually defused the debate. 
argues, the expectations generated by oil have long since been 
we '.nay still hope that unemployment will play a comparable role 
catalyst in Scottish politics in the 1980's. If it does not, then 




Abridged from 'The Jumblies' by Edward Lear in Jackson, Hol 
(ed.) The Complete Nonsense of Edward Lear Faber & Faber Ltd 






















The authors gratefully acknowledge as the source of this abridg-
ed version a se"ior civil servant whose identity (for diplomatic 
reasons) is best left undisclosed. 
Maxwell, S., The Politics of Unemployment in Scotland, Political 
Quarterly, January 1981 
Deacon, A., 'The Scrounging Controversy', Social and Economic 
Administration, Vol. 12, 1978 
Deacon, A., 'Unemployment and politics in Britain since 1945' in 
Shawler, Brian and Sinfield,Adrian eds. The Workless State, 
Martin Robertson, 1980. 
National Institute Economic Review, No.95, February 1981 
Data in remainder of paragraph from Scottish Economic Bulletin 
No.22 Spring 1981 and Fraser of Allander Institute ~.1arterly 
Economic Commentary Vol. 6, No.4 April 1981. The percentage falls 
in individ.1al industries refer to the 15 months to September 1980. 
Manpower Services Commission Plan for Scotland 1981-85 and in-
formation from MSC Scotland Office. 
The Scotsman, 6 March 1981 
Department of Employment Employment Gazette June 1981. The sea-
sonally adjusted total in May (excluding School leavers) was 
273,300, an increase of almost 7,000 over the figure for January 
1981. 
The Scotsman, 6 March 1931 
British Labour Statistics, Historical Abstracts 1886 1968, Table 
162. 
Department of Employment returns, made available by MSC, Scotland 
Ministry of Labour Gazette, July 1966, Table 116 
Department of Employment Emnloyment Gazette, January 1981 
Department of Employment Press Release,February 1931 
Department o£ Employment Employment Gazette December 1979 and 
January 1981 and authors' calculations. 
For a review of economic trends in the Scottish Regions, see 
Scottish Economic Bulleti~, No.21 Summer 1930 
Information from Department of Employment returns supplied by 
MSC Scotland office and authors' calculations 
Scottish Economic Bulletin, No. 21, 1980 
Sorrentino, Constance 'Unemploy:nent in international perspec-
tive'in Shawler, Brian and Sinfield, Adrian eds. The Workless 
State, Martin Robertson, 1980 
Fraser of Allander Institute Quarterly Economic Commentary, 
Vol. 6, No.3, January 1931. 
22. The Times, 30 March, 1981 
23. 'Monetary Policy', House of Commons Treasury and Ci::.il Service 








'Financial Statement and Budget Report, 1980/81' HC 500 
HMSO, 25 March 1980 
For a fuller review of the Goverlli~ent's economic policy see 
National Institute Economic Review no. 95, February 1981 
Fraser of Allander Institute Quarterly Economic Commentary vol. 
6, No.3, January 1981 
Hansard 16 February 1981, col. 117 (Mr Alick Buchanan-Smith, 
Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) 
Fraser of Allander Institute op.cit., p.9 
Hansard, 16 February 1981 col. 112 (Mr Austin 
30. The Scotsman, 20 February, 1981 
31. National Institute Economic Review, ~cit., p.lO 
32. The Scotsman, 10 April 1981 
33. Department of Employment, Employment Gazette Vol. 89, No.2, 
Feb. 1981 commentary 
34. The Scotsma~, 14 February, 1981 














Fraser of Allander Institute Quarterly Economic Cooonentary 
6, No.2 October 1980 pp.22-24 see also Barker T. The Economic 
Consequences of Monetarism: A Keynesian View of the British 
Economy 1980-1990, Cambridge Journal of Economics 4, No.4, 1980
The Scotsman, 12 February 1981 
National Institute_Economic Review, op. cit. 
a fall for fixed investment in manufacturing 
Barry Moore and John Rhodes 'Regional Policy and the 
Economy', Scottish Journal of Political Economy Vol. XXI No.3, 
November 1974. 
'Employment Trends in Scotland in the 1970's'~ish ~·-vuv•u~
Bulletin No.21 Summer 1980 table 2 
i£i£, p.9 
'A Frillnework for Industry in Scotland', Scottish Council 
elopment & Industry)Research Institute April 1978. 
Moore a~d Rhodes, on. cit., pp.227-8 
'Employment Trends in Scotland in the 1970's', op. cit. p.ll 
Data from Scottish Economic Bulletin No. 21, Summer 1980, the 
quarterly economic series and the article 'Employment Trends 
in Scotland in the 1970's'. 
For a comparison of changes in the working population a~d em-
ployment between 1971 and 1980 see MSC Plan for Scotland 1981-
~ MSC Office for Scotland, April 1981, A11.nex ·III, Figure 3 
The series of Scotland's unemployment relative with Great Bri~
tain is published in C.S.O. Regional Trends, 1981 








'Overseas Investment in Scottish Manufacturing Industry' Scott-
ish Economic Bulletin~ no. 20, Spring 1980 ------
'Employment Trends in Scotland in the 1970's' op. cit., Annex 2, 
Tables 1 and 2 
Scottish Economic Bulletin no. 22, Spring 1981 
'Overseas Investment in Scottish Manufacturing Industry', 
op. cit. 
Gordon C. Cameron 'The National Industrial Strategy and Regional 
Policy' in Duncan Maclennan and John B. Parr (eds.) Regional 
Policy: Past Experience and New Directions Martin Robertson 1979 
'Expenditure on regio~al preferential assistance to industry in 
Scotland' Scottish Economic Bulletin no. 9, Winter 1976 and 
Scottish Economic Bulletin, No. 22, Spring 1981 
55. 'Identifiable public expenditure on Industry, Energy, Trade, 
and Employment' Rabie 15.11 in Central Statistical Office, Re-
gional Trends, 1981 
56. Fraser N.A. and Orton, I. 'Regional Development Grants: The 
Scottish Experience, 1975-79 1 in Fraser of Allender Institute 
















C.S.O. Regional Trend~, 198~Regional Profile, Scotland. 
Makeham, Peter,Youth Unemployment,Department of Employment Re-
search Paper No.lO, March, 1980 
Sinfield, Adrian What Unemployment Means, Martin Robertson, 1981 
p.72. 
C.S.O. Regional Trends, 1981 
Mr John Davidson, quoted in article 'Scotland Tomorrow' by 
Andrew Hargrave, The Scotsman, July 2, 1981 
Figures, from the industrial training boards concerned, quoted 
by &1.drew Hargrave in The Scotsman, July 1, 1981 
MSC Review of the first year of Special Programmes, 1979 
MSC Pian for Scotland 1981-1985 p.l2 
Robert Taylor 'The Decay of Youth Opportunity' The Observer 
12 July 1981 
Department of Employment, Employment Gazette April 1981 table 
2.15 
Robert Taylor, op. cit. 
MSC P~an for Scotland 1981-1985, pp.28, 30 and 21 
Department of Employment Employment Gazett~ April 1981 table 
1.5. Trends in women's employment and unemployment (and the role 
of part-time employment) are analysed in Mallier, Tony and 
Rosser, Mike 'The Changing Role of Women in the British Economy' 
National Westminster Bank Quarterly Review, November 1979 
MSC Plan for Scotla~d 1981-85, p.31 
















reproduced in Amsden, Alice H., 
Penguin, 1930 
72. Townsend, Peter, Poverty in the United Kingdom, Penguin 1979, 
p.631 
73. Daniel, W.W., 'Why is high unemployment still somehow accept-
able?', New SDciety, 19 March 1981 
74. MSC Plan £or Scotland 1931-85 An~ex II 
75. R<c,port by Sir Derek Rayner Payment o£ Bene£i ts to Unemployed 
PeopleL HMSO 1981 
76. Daniel, W.W., 'In defence o£ jDb centres' New Society, 16 April
1931 
77. MSC Plan for Scotland 1981-85, p.l4 
78. Sinfield, Adrian, What Unemployment Means, Martin Robertson, 
1981, p.92 
79. This and subsequent references to Kaldor refer to Kaldor, N., 
'Monetarism and U.K. Monetary Policy' in ~bridge Journal o£ 
Econonics Vol.4, No.4, 1930 
80. Quoted in Savage D. •:vt3netary Targets and the Control o£ the 
Money Supply' in National Institute Economic Revi~\IT_No.89, 
ktgust 1979. 
81. Bacon, Robert & Eltis, Walter, Britain's Economic Problem: 
Too Few Producers, Macmillan 1976. ----
82. Peston,Maurice 'Economic Aspects o£ Unemploym~nt 1 ,ru~~c~~a~ ~u~~
terly, January 1981. 
83. Firn, John, 'Industrial Policy' 
land 1980. Q Press 1977 
84. 'Towards an Employment Stcategy £or Scotland', Scottcsh counc1~
(Developme~and~~u~~ Research Institute, -~-~ 
85. 
86. Donald, D., & Hutton, A., 
and Ant~~eprivation Strategy?, 







in Planning Outlook, Vol. 
The list is £rom Scottish 
"Urban and Regional Policy" in Camb::id·ii.e Economic Pol1cy l{eV1~
Vol. 6 No.2 July 1980 
f.E.~~r o£ Allandor. _Institute ~arterly Economic Commenta~ Vol.
6, No.2, October 1980 
For one o£ the clearest expositions, see Gough, Ian, The Poli-
_!ic~no~~-~_w.,!:_l£ar~, Macmillan 1979 
For an Overview see Sin£ield, Adrian, ~cit. 
Ma~ell, S., on. cit. 
122 
 
 
 
 
 
